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The limits of publicity: Facebook and transformations of a public 
realm in Mombasa, Kenya 
Over the past decade, Kenyan citizens have actively engaged in public 
communication through digital media. With the growth of digital communication, 
questions arise about its effect on the nature and political significance of public 
discussion. Does the political contribution of public discussion shift if it takes 
place on a virtual site or in a face-to-face gathering? Looking in the context of 
Mombasa, Kenya, this paper provides a unique perspective about how and why 
there is cause for concern about the political implications of Facebook-mediated 
discussion. It interrogates the extent to which Facebook provides for discussion 
that is capable of reshaping shared imaginaries among Kenyans. To do this, I first 
outline the specific form that publicity takes on Facebook, taking into account 
both its openness and limitations. Second, I analyse what this has meant for the 
reconfiguration of shared political imaginaries. Drawing on the case of the public 
Facebook group, Mombasa Youth Senate, I argue that the conditions of Facebook 
create an open space that provides a great deal of flexibility in how people can 
appear and be recognised. However, this open and flexible experience frustrates 
the emergence of new and shared ideas of difference and belonging. Facebook’s 
underlying structures combined with user experiences are reinforcing rather than 
reconfiguring established ideas of citizen-state relations. 
Keywords: citizen participation, publics, public sphere, social media, Facebook, 
Mombasa, Kenya  
Introduction 
On 29 September 2014, a young man in Mombasa posted the following statement 
within the public Facebook group, ‘Mombasa Youth Senate’:  
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To all members of this group,we appreciate your contributions in this forum. 
Nobody should take anything personal coz [because] the issues debated here are 
purely for the benefit of the good people of msa [Mombasa] county n [and] kenya 
at large.  
Those charged with the responsibility in public offices should give out information 
willingly without being coerced to do so.  
Thank you,yes you reading this, for being part of this noble idea.  
GOD BLESS KENYA 
GOD BLESS MOMBASA 
GOD BLESS MSA YOUTH SENATE GOD BLESS US ALL  
Have a great day1  
This statement reflects a rise in active debate about politics on the social 
networking site, Facebook, in Kenya in the 2010s. It was directly preceded by a lively 
discussion about a report published in one of Kenya’s main national newspapers about 
county government spending. Discussion of the report in this group took place over four 
days and 76 comments, in which participants debated budget allocation processes, 
government effectiveness, and the appropriate protocol for the Facebook conversation. 
Even a member of Mombasa’s County Assembly contributed content. Facebook 
discussions like this, in public forums and about local politics, have become 
commonplace in Kenya, drawing on the diverse forms of expression possible. This 
conversation was text-based, but more recently ‘discussions’ also involve sharing and 
responding to photos, videos, memes and articles.    
Debates over citizen-state relations, loosely defined, on Facebook are framed by 
a longer-standing struggle to create space for opposition voices and citizen participation 
in Kenya, from the push for multiparty politics in the 1990s and debates preceding a 
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new constitution in 2010. These debates have been contested through diverse channels, 
including protest movements, political satire, print broadsheets and radio broadcasts.2 A 
steady increase in access to and use of digital communication media3 has brought new 
media for past forms of expression, for example, the creation of a televised and online 
political satire show, The XYZ Show, as well as new forums, like Facebook and 
WhatsApp groups.  
Mobile phones and the internet appear to profoundly affect who can produce 
public information, and whose voices might be heard in debates over citizen-state 
relations. In Mombasa, there were few active public Facebook groups about local 
politics prior to the 2013 General Elections, the year afterwards seeing a growth in their 
number, size and activity.4 This article interrogates the political significance of changes 
in the material base of public discussion. Taking a unique view in African Studies of 
publics and their significance, it empirically examines the nature and possibilities of 
Facebook-mediated discussion in Mombasa through Hannah Arendt’s ideas that the 
value of publics lies in their potential to re-configure shared imaginaries. This article 
makes a two-fold argument. It finds the conditions of communication on Facebook 
illuminate the nature of what it means for a discussion to be a ‘public’, specifically its 
underdetermined and fleeting nature. Equally, this article argues the particular way 
these conditions take shape through Facebook in relation to Mombasa politics has 
perverse effects on their potential to create new and shared imaginaries amongst 
citizens. They are generating mistrust and diverting participants’ attention away from 
public appearances to what might be hidden from view. 
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A limited and contingent view of publics 
The study of ‘publics’ focuses attention on spaces and moments constituted through 
public talk, taking shape in the act “of being addressed”.5 In the 1990s, the study of 
publics in African Studies tended to be highly normative, looking for moments of 
inclusive and equitable ‘public talk’ as a basis for democratic legitimacy.6 In recent 
years, there is evidence of a greater effort to establish empirically-grounded ideas about 
the nature of publics on the continent.7 New communication technologies add 
complexity to the study of publics in Africa. Empirically, the boundaries of publics 
become increasingly difficult to pinpoint, both spatially as people can engage 
simultaneously in virtual and physical places, and temporally, as individuals can choose 
to communicate almost instantaneously or delay.8 Normatively, when considering their 
effect on citizen participation, digital media are found to have ambivalent effects: 
making discursive practices more inclusionary or exclusionary, or augmenting 
inequalities or providing opportunities for disruptive citizen engagement.9 Assessing the 
significance of digitally-mediated ‘publics’ in relation to forms of rule results in 
contradictory views about the political affinities of digital media. Some find an affinity 
between digital media and popular politics.10 Others identify how new communication 
technologies are most effectively employed by those in positions of authority.11  
This article argues for an alternative way of interpreting the significance of 
digitally-mediated publics, which accepts this ambivalence and identifies value in 
within these contradictory dynamics. It suggests, in the digital world, there is a case to 
be made for basing the normative value of publics on something other than a 
relationship to rule. Drawing from Hannah Arendt, I take the view that limited publics 
can still have normative significance. Arendt locates the value of publics in their 
potential to reconfigure shared imaginaries between strangers, irrespective of what new 
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form these shared imaginaries take. This creative capacity is possible when 
communication takes place within two conditions: publicity, when it extends to 
potentially unknown strangers, and plurality, when participants can openly and equally 
express their distinctness.12  
Yet, Arendt does not search for these conditions in an ideal form in practice. 
Rather, she suggests they always materialise in limited forms depending on the media, 
space and conventions within which people interact.13 Forms of control are necessary to 
the act of public discussion, to bring order and stability to communications. Publicity, or 
‘the quality of being public’, takes on distinct forms as people make themselves known 
to strangers, and as others make sense of what appears. The basis for assessing the value 
of digitally-mediated publics from this perspective requires first interrogating specific 
forms of publicity and plurality possible through digital channels, and second, 
interrogating the potential for new and shared imaginaries to materialise given these 
particular conditions.  
To examine the creative power of publics on Facebook, this article draws on 
participant observations and interviews conducted in 2013 and 2014 in Mombasa, with 
further online observations until June 2015. Online observations were recorded and 
analysed through fieldnotes and PDF screen shots. To avoid using potentially sensitive 
information without people’s knowledge on social media,14 I observed public groups 
and pages. Observations of Mombasa Youth Senate’s (MYS) public Facebook group 
began after being invited into the group by the conveners, who were aware of my 
interest as a researcher. Private communications through SMS and online messaging 
were treated with the same confidentiality as face-to-face interviews and 
correspondence, and were only considered for research purposes when the individual 
involved was aware of my interest as a researcher. Any Facebook user names that were 
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not already anonymised or tied to public figures have been removed or pseudonyms 
have been used.  
This article now turns to examine the case of the public Facebook group, MYS. 
It begins by reviewing dominant shared imaginaries as identified in scholarship, which 
define the terms of political and public debates in Mombasa. From here, attention shifts 
to MYS. I outline the features that give rise to specific conditions of publicity and 
plurality, and unpack associated constraints and forms of control. I then consider how 
these forms of publicity and plurality implicate configuration of shared imaginaries. I 
conclude by reflecting on the significance for citizen-state relations in Mombasa, as 
well as further study of digital publics more widely. 
Digital media and publics in Mombasa 
The identities through which citizen-state relations are debated in Mombasa have 
sharpened since independence, with political differences becoming constructed 
according to place of origin, religion and ethnicity. The 2013 elections in Mombasa, the 
first under the devolved system introduced in the 2010 Kenyan Constitution, drew 
attention to competing bases of political identity. At first glance, electoral outcomes at 
the national level and in new county governments suggested the majority of the 
Mombasa electorate shared partisan allegiances. The Orange Democratic Movement 
(ODM) won all seats in the County Assembly and Executive, and four out of six posts 
for Member of Parliaments to the National Assembly. ODM had a general appeal as a 
party in favour of devolution, led by Raila Odinga.  
ODM’s electoral success overlies long-standing differences in ideas and 
experiences of citizen-state relations among residents of Mombasa.15 Mombasa’s 
population is diverse. A poll by Ipsos Public Affairs in October 2013 found that one-
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third of residents identified with ethnic groups originating from outside of the coastal 
region. Religiously, Mombasa was 40% Muslims and 60% Christians.16 The 2013 
election campaigns brought renewed contestations over coastal secession, which 
constructed divisions along racial and ethnic lines. Debates highlighted some residents’ 
shared identity as wapwani (people of the Coast), and were reminiscent of narratives 
from the independence period. The relatively covert organisation known as the 
Mombasa Republic Council (MRC) became increasingly active in campaigning for 
coastal independence in 2010 and 2011.17 Individuals and publications advocating for 
coastal secession invoked different group identities, for example, sometimes 
campaigning for the rights and unity of wapwani,18 and sometimes separating out Arab, 
Swahili and Mijikenda peoples.19  
Religious differences have also sharpened as relevant to citizen-state relations in 
recent years. Public narratives depict the national government as premised upon 
Christian law and hostile to Muslim populations. National politicians have publicly 
professed to be practicing Christians.20 A shared sense of disadvantage as Muslim has 
been heightened amidst the Kenyan government’s rhetoric and participation in a global 
“war on terrorism”.21 A 2015 report by the Kenya National Commission on Human 
Rights (KNCHR) accuses Kenyan security agencies of 25 extrajudicial killings and 81 
forced disappearances during counterterrorism operations.22 This echoes a report 
launched in Mombasa in 2014, which relayed stories by members of Kenya’s Muslim 
community about unlawful killings and enforced disappearances.23 Legal and 
extrajudicial activities in Mombasa have amplified perceived exclusion along both 
religious and ethnic lines. Attacks by al-Shabaab within Kenya have provoked religious 
conflict, including attacks on churches.24 Differing ideas of grievance arise: on one side, 
instances of terrorism, linked to al-Shabaab, have constructed Christians as victims; on 
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the other side, victimisation has remained strongly felt amongst Kenya’s Muslim 
communities. 
Public discussions articulating political divisions unfold upon a varied and 
evolving urban communication environment.25 A port city and transport hub, 
Mombasa’s street networks are organised around a few primary transit ways that link 
the city to the north and south coasts, and inland to Nairobi. Informal baraza materialise 
as spaces for publicly-minded discussion on street corners and in front of houses. 
Baraza reflect continuities with Swahili social practices during and prior to the British 
colonial period.26 More violent forms of expression, including attacks on homes and 
shops and street-based protests, also take place from time to time, tied to issues such as 
land rights, coastal distinctiveness and religious difference.27 Leaflets also circulate in 
the streets during moments of unrest; for example, threatening settlement communities 
in the Coast in June 2014 during attacks in Mpeketoni, Lamu County. 
Amidst this, as noted at the outset of this article, the use of digital 
communications in Mombasa has risen, particularly since Kenya’s first connection to 
international undersea fibre optic cables in 2009. Within expanding opportunities for 
social media access, Mombasa Youth Senate (MYS) was created on Facebook by 
several young people, all residents of Mombasa, in late January 2014. The Facebook 
group was accompanied by a Twitter handle, blog and Facebook page. Its Facebook 
group quickly became the most active for public discussion (see Figure 1). Individuals 
would share and discuss information about Mombasa politics in the Facebook group 
throughout the day and into the night. When it was first created in late January 2014, 
208 Facebook profiles were subscribed to the group as ‘members’. By 31 August 2014, 
there were 1,762 members, rising to 4,915 by 3 February 2015, approximately one year 
after its creation.  
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Accessing and making discussion ‘public’ 
As indicated above, plurality and publicity shift from abstract to concrete forms as 
people interact in specific contexts and practices. In MYS’s Facebook group, publicity 
began with the separation and individualisation of participants’ experiences as they 
access and experience discussion through individual devices, and personalised 
interfaces. First Facebook was accessible through a variety of devices. In Mombasa, and 
Kenya more widely, this has often occurred through data-enabled mobile phones.28 
While internet cafes were still accessible in Mombasa during fieldwork, the 
administrators of MYS’s Facebook group accessed the site through mobile phones. 
Someone could comment on a post immediately through a device, or wait and 
contribute later, provided it was not deleted. Their new contribution would return the 
post to the top of the group’s discussion page.  
Individualised devices also meant that the format of what was observed could 
differ in ways that were undetected by other participants. One interviewee showed me 
Facebook on his basic feature phone – images were not visible and text was in a basic 
format. He could scroll through 100 comments on a post at a time, but he could not see 
the total number of comments, and he could not easily search for specific content.29 
MYS’s founders had versions of smart phones with greater data capacities and more 
varied interfaces, for example, they could see and take photos. 
From here, the Facebook group was ‘public’ in that its content was potentially 
visible to anyone with a Facebook profile. The features of the public group allowed its 
content to be accessible to users without prior moderation of group administrators, 
though only group members could post and comment. Current members of MYS could 
also add users from their Facebook network to MYS without administrators’ approval. 
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Others could request to join pending administrators’ approval. With this, membership 
has grown beyond the acquaintances of the founders.30     
 Further indicating a ‘public’ scope, participants’ presence as observers was not 
visible to other users. During fieldwork, a Facebook group did not indicate which and 
how many users had viewed specific content. A user could observe what was shared 
undetected. Someone’s whereabouts might be claimed or approximated on Facebook 
through its location services but individuals’ locations could not be identified by other 
users in the group.  
The condition of publicity on Facebook also had a temporal dimension, tied to 
users’ uncertainty about when others participated and how timing affected what each 
observed. Actions taking place between the original posting and the time of observation 
affected what was visible. Either the user responsible or the group administrators could 
permanently delete posts and comments. If a user deactivated their Facebook account, 
their posts and comments also disappeared, but could reappear if a user re-activated 
their account. Administrators could block users from the group, preventing the blocked 
user from viewing or contributing content. Blocked users’ comments and posts 
remained visible, accompanied by a ‘greyed out’ user name. To illustrate the effect of 
timing on individuals’ experiences, I copied a discussion in MYS about a nominated 
Senator as viewed on my laptop in February, April and October 2015. Indicated in 
Figures 2 and 3, comments appeared differently each time it was accessed. Users 
changed their profile photos and names. Comments disappeared and reappeared. One 
member’s comments were invisible when observed in April, but reappeared in October.  
To summarise, publicity emerged through features in MYS that individualised 
experiences. The reach of discussion on MYS was experienced as public, or inclusive of 
strangers, because individuals participated through personal devices in their own time. 
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Anyone within Facebook’s networks could be viewing content, but each participant 
could not know who else was participating, when and what they observed, and how 
others’ observations differed from their own.   
Providing for an open and equal exchange 
Similar to publicity, the condition of plurality, the open and equal expression of 
difference, was bound up with Facebook’s structures and affordances. Generally, on 
Facebook, individuals express themselves through user profiles and interactions with 
other users through various forms of connection, including groups, pages, applications, 
and other evolving features. In MYS, the user profile and the Facebook group were 
most directly linked to how individuals appeared in the group’s communications. Both 
contributed to how individuals appeared. For example, posts and comments were 
accompanied by a profile picture and user name.31  
Considering the user profile, to quote from boyd and Ellison (2007), 
“[Facebook] [p]rofiles are unique pages where one can ‘type oneself into being’.”32 
Participants in MYS would use the Facebook profile to construct images that did not 
necessarily align with how they appeared elsewhere. Reflecting a wider practice of 
referring to others by unofficial titles or affiliations,33 some members of MYS altered 
and/or obscured given names on Facebook, and claimed titles that they did not formally 
hold, such as Honourable, Mheshimiwa (honourable), Prince, Mzee (elder, older person) 
or Governor. To illustrate, among 1,266 visible34 members of MYS on 14 August 2014, 
4% (N = 53) claimed such a title, and 15% (N = 193) appeared to have explicitly 
adapted their names. They used descriptors such as Mombasani (of Mombasa) or Swthrt 
(Sweetheart), and dropped vowels and changed consonants from formal English or 
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Kiswahili spellings. The presence of altered names and titles with MYS’s membership 
hint at the flexible and diverse appearances possible on Facebook.   
Further indicating diversity in individuals’ appearances, a profile did not have to 
align with one person.35 One person sometimes appeared to have created multiple 
profiles, and some users within MYS’s membership represented organisations or 
campaigns, such as ‘Alac Mombasa’36 and ‘Kecosce Mombasa’.37 Other profiles were 
devised to be fully anonymous; a user hid his or her name, gender, physical appearance 
and place of residence. Further, there were indications of ‘fake’ profiles in MYS 
participants’ networks, referring to profiles that pretended to be another person, real or 
fictional. Periodic allegations have been made within MYS that there were invalid 
profiles claiming to be the Governor of Mombasa.38  
As individuals interacted within the group, they were presented with additional 
features that expand how they might express themselves. This included the ability to 
share photos, videos and memes, link to other websites, groups and users, and make 
text-based statements. During fieldwork, users posted, tagged and shared photos of 
themselves in the group. They sometimes included captions that indicated a specific 
location, event or acquaintances, or link a photo to other user profiles. In some cases, a 
profile was anonymous, but contributions made to the group discussion indicated a 
specific individual. A case in point, one active MYS member’s profile39 did not use the 
given name or title of senator, but posted and responded to others’ posts from the 
perspective of a nominated Senator,40 Hon. Emma Mbura, including sharing photos of 
herself. The features of the Facebook user profile and group interface equipped 
individuals with discretion over how they presented themselves, enabling them to 
continually re-shape how they appear. Plurality thus materialised in the ease and fluidity 
with which individuals could present themselves online.  
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In MYS’s Facebook group, conditions of publicity and plurality acquired 
specific characteristics that were tied to the structures and practices through which 
discussion takes place. Discussion was public because any Facebook user might be 
observing content undetected by others, as each participates through individual devices 
and personalised online interfaces. Discussion allowed for plurality as individuals were 
visible to others through malleable and fleeting virtual appearances. These specificities 
raise the question that is the focus for the next section: have these forms of publicity and 
plurality affected the potential for new and shared imaginaries to take hold across a 
community of strangers? Or, have they been sufficient for unleashing this creative 
capacity of publics? 
Underlying contingencies on a public and plural discussion 
Publicity and plurality have become inseparable from material structures, institutions 
and actors.41 Underlying structures and forms of order limit the reach of discussion and 
how differences can be expressed. MYS’s discussion has become contingent upon 
controls at the group level, and the level of Facebook as a technological and corporate 
entity. Forms of control at both levels simultaneously enable, restrict and threaten 
publicity and plurality. Most visible to the participant, the publicity and plurality of 
MYS has depended on the group administrators. Its features as a ‘public group’ were 
the result of choices made by group administrators. It is not necessarily the case that the 
discussion must, or will, remain accessible to any Facebook user. At any point, group 
administrators could choose to exercise their control over access and participation, for 
example, blocking individuals or deleting content. They could also restrict access more 
permanently, such as introducing requirements for administrator approval to comment, 
join or view discussion.  
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MYS’s administrators were aware of their control over group access and 
content. They periodically made participants aware of this in the group. In one example, 
on 20 September 2014, one administrator posted to MYS:  
We have no apology for blocking people who cant meet the quality of agument as 
per the post. i mean those people who shift away from the post and start engaging 
into personal issues. some of them are returning with fake accounts after being 
blocked.42  
For the duration of fieldwork, group administrators allowed MYS to be 
accessible to any Facebook user, and attempted to shape discussion by appealing to 
users to exercise self-censorship. To illustrate, one administrator posted on 12 
November 2014:   
1.We want to thank all the new members who joined this forum. 2.we have 
recieved more than 300 requests within a week. 3.we want to urge our members to 
fill free on any issue posted here and debate freely.4. u r allowed to agree or differ 
on any matter bt [but] on a positive point. 5.Dont insult anybody. 6. if u post 
anything with no likes or comment, then dont worry coz [because] the message is 
already passed. 6.43  
While group administrators did not exercise their control over what was said and 
who participated, allowing for unpredictability in both regards, this was not sufficient to 
ensure the group retained its particular forms of publicity and plurality. These 
conditions also depended on limits tied to Facebook as a technological and corporate 
entity.  
To begin, participation on Facebook requires access to enabling infrastructure. 
This brings implicit forms of exclusion. In Kenya, social media activity has been 
growing, but access to internet or data-enabled devices remains limited. In 2012 
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Research ICT Africa found that while 74.0% of those aged 15 years and above in Kenya 
owned mobile phones, 32.3% owned a mobile phone capable of browsing the internet. 
Further, mobile internet was more common than internet access via computers; this 
same study found 21.2% used a computer, the majority through an internet café 
(68.8%).44 Beyond this, access to reliable telecommunications networks and electricity 
is unequally distributed between homes and neighbourhoods in Mombasa.45 During 
fieldwork, blackouts were sometimes daily, lasting from a few minutes to hours.   
During fieldwork, these inequalities were framed by widespread material 
insecurity in Mombasa. High levels of unemployment and temporary employment in 
Mombasa restrict who might participate on Facebook. In October 2013, the global 
market research company, Ipsos Synovate, released a survey of adults aged 18 years and 
above in the coastal region of Kenya.46 They found the majority of respondents were not 
in full time employment and there were substantial levels of poverty. Only 18% 
indicated they were employed full time in either the public or private sector. Amongst 
those employed, 28% in Mombasa earned less than 10,000 Kenyan shillings47 per 
month. Wider material differences affect the ease with which individuals might access 
the technical devices and networked services required for Facebook, indicating forms of 
exclusion that might limit the reach of publicity. 
Facebook also exists as a corporate entity with its logics and interests that 
further delineate who might participate and how.48 Facebook grows as people create 
profiles and grow social networks.49 Its active user base, the time they spend online and 
the data that is produced through their engagements has become the basis for revenue 
generation.50 Jodi Dean provides a strong critique of networked communications and its 
corporate underpinnings. She argues this turns communication into a commodity, 
meaning its primary function is for capitalist production, rather than political or social 
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ends.51 Underlying interests and structures impact on who might access and participate 
in Facebook-enabled discussions. Napoli and Obar (2014) raise concerns about the 
potential for the ‘walled garden metaphor’ to characterise mobile internet access as 
economic accumulation becomes the primary aim. This occurs when users’ access is 
somehow restricted to proprietary content, for example, through payment regulations or 
vertically integrated systems.52 In Kenya, such constraints were becoming visible in 
2014 as Facebook and Airtel Kenya formed a partnership to provide access to specific 
internet services and sites through the Facebook platform, internet.org.53 
Further, networked and corporate dimensions of Facebook made the public 
group vulnerable to sudden closure. Without participants’ input, either group 
administrators or Facebook could shut down a public group. A limited number of 
people had this control, but those who did could exercise it easily and suddenly. This 
indicates a precariousness of publics through Facebook, contrasting with physical 
infrastructure that wears over time and requires physical displays of force to be 
destroyed. 
In looking at the dynamics and structures of public discussions, a complex and 
contradictory picture of MYS as public emerges. Networked structures have brought 
different forms of control and exclusion. This includes the group administrators who 
could, but chose not to, restrict access and content, the technical requirements of 
participation, and the underlying imperatives of corporate Facebook that continue to 
drive its development. Still, these structures must also be seen to have enabled 
participants to experience publicity and plurality. Participants could not be certain about 
who is participating, even though the space was exclusionary. Also, there was a range of 
options available to them to express themselves, even if these options were shaped by 
corporate interests. 
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Political possibilities of a constrained and contingent ‘digital’ public 
Thus far, I have laid out contradictory conditions that give shape to publicity and 
plurality in MYS on Facebook. What has not yet been considered is whether there is an 
argument to be made for the normative value of this limited public. Now I turn to 
consider existing shared imaginaries in political discourse in Mombasa and the potential 
they could be disrupted. As will be the focus for the remainder of this article, even when 
releasing publics of normative aims tied to democratic legitimacy or citizen 
participation, MYS’s Facebook group has fallen short as participants’ experiences 
frustrate the realisation of new and shared imaginaries. 
Importantly, participant’s experiences were limited the novelty of imaginaries 
that take shape. First, participants’ attention has been directed to familiar relations, 
rather than complete strangers. Facebook has tended to link users along lines of 
familiarity and/or similarity; this was evident, for example, in the greater activity and 
communication possible among users who were connected as Facebook ‘friends’. 
Familiarity was also evident in the very founding of MYS as a space for public and 
political discussion. The idea for the group developed through face-to-face 
conversations between friends. All of this framed a degree of familiarity within the 
group. Users sometimes jointly narrated an event on the ground. In August 2014, a few 
members discussed their experiences together at international youth day celebrations in 
Mombasa in MYS; this discussion unfolded through both photos and text.54 Users also 
copied content from private online messaging services in MYS’s public discussion, 
further indicating that public engagement was underpinned by more personal 
connections.55 
Second, novelty was constrained by patterns in how participants draw 
conclusions about the nature and scope of the group. Group administrators were singled 
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out among the wider participant base by virtue of their administrative capacities. New 
members periodically ‘thanked’ group administrators for ‘adding’ them to the group, to 
which individual administrators sometimes responded directly.56 As mentioned above, 
administrators also drew attention to their unique ability to block individuals or delete 
content.57 This became a source of contention at times as accusations were made that 
administrators restricted contributions on the basis of their partisan leanings; thus 
participants imagined the group to be bound by partisan lines. Individuals also became 
prominent through their contributions. Two participants were responsible for 16 out of 
24 posts that generated 50 comments or more between 30 January and 14 April 2014. 
This again gives the impression that the group has convened around a few individuals 
and their perspectives. 
Further challenges to the scope of new imaginaries appeared through patterns in 
how participants have responded to others’ contributions. Though who participated was 
continually questionable, users hesitated to interpret others in new ways. There was 
often a personal and partisan tinge to how participants assessed others’ contributions. 
This was evident as participants continually voiced suspicions that users were 
manipulating their online appearance in order to hide personal or partisan bias. 
Suspicions were directed towards the administrators as well as more generally. 
Participants raised allegations that politicians indirectly manipulated MYS’s discussion, 
for example, paying users to make specific comments. In July 2014, a conversation 
about two county leaders58 digressed into allegations about participants’ personal 
motivations for engaging in the discussion. One was accused of having been paid by a 
specific politician to make biased statements. An MYS administrator commented: 
“XXXX is a driver to Mwembe Tayari ward rep” and also, “@JX we understand u 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT WITH THE JOURNAL OF EASTERN AFRICAN 
STUDIES – NOT FOR CITATION OR CIRCULATION 
20 
 
[you] sold ua fb acc [your Facebook account] @1k to a ward rep to insult this pg [page]. 
u [you] wont make it.”59  
Shared concern about hidden personal and partisan biases was clearly conveyed 
in a discussion following a post on 1 October 2014, in which one user queried the 
identity of a Facebook user and MYS participant, asking “who is Mpwani Halisi”. 
Mpwani Halisi was a Facebook user whose name, translated from Kiswahili, meant ‘an 
authentic person from the Coast’. In comments on this post, participants expressed 
discomfort with claims to anonymity. They asked what perverse or personal interests 
might compel someone to adopt an anonymous profile. One individual commented, “It 
seems you have been caught in a snare . Its either one of the two you are coward or you 
are ashamed of yourself “. A Member of the County Assembly also commented, 
suggesting anomymity to be a mask through which to criticise politicians: “Am sorry! I 
dont need any praises! But, sadly u have an agenda to tarnish the image of some 
leaders! And praise others whom you work for! #truthexposed Aibu wallahi!! [shame 
from Allah!!]”.60 It was difficult for those who commented to imagine Mpwani Halisi 
could discuss local politics without being aligned to a certain politician or political 
party.  
Still, while these suspicions constrained how participants might be seen, they did 
not foreclose the possibility of alternative interpretations. Suspicions remained 
unsubstantiated. This became clear when one of the group administrators again 
questioned Mpwani Halisi’s identity a few months later, indicating the issue was 
unresolved.61 Uncertainty drove MYS participants both to suspect one another of 
personal bias and prevented them from confirming their suspicions. As a result, multiple 
imaginings have remained at play. Different ways of interpreting others through the 
group were apparent even among the MYS group administrators. On Facebook and in 
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conversation with the author, group administrators shared different lenses through 
which they interpreted contributions. At times, they were suspicious that partisan and 
personal biases informed others’ contributions. At times, they directed their own 
contributions to a specific individual, naming a public figure or a personal acquaintance 
and sometimes linking that user to the contribution so that they would receive an 
individual alert.62 They also would imagine the audience as ‘senators’, addressing their 
posts and comments to the ‘senators’ of MYS. In so doing, they separated participants 
based on the nature of their comments. Finally, administrators’ statements indicated and 
sometimes addressed a more indiscriminate audience.  
Finally, though the example of MYS administrators shows there has not be one 
agreed way of imagining participants and how they relate, the realisation of new and 
shared imaginaries has not necessarily been forthcoming. Thus far, the questionable 
scope of the group and identity of participants seems to prevent any sense of shared 
interpretation. The separation of individuals’ experiences not only has made suspicions 
unsubstantiated, but also has made it difficult to imagine, with any degree of certainty, 
that others might share someone’s interpretation. A sense of being part of an identifiable 
collectivity thus far seems beyond any participant’s vantage point. 
Conclusion 
Scholarship on digitally-mediated publics in Africa has tended to view digital media 
instrumentally in relation to the effect of publics on forms of rule. Digital media 
strengthen the influence of those who access and use them effectively: whether as 
citizens for citizen participation or as governments for surveillance.63 In contrast, here, 
communication technologies are not assessed as politically significant to publics based 
on the nature of rule they enable. This article accepts that publics always have 
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contradictory relationships with rule in practice, and assesses the political significance 
of digitally-mediated publics as mechanisms of change in shared imaginaries, rather 
than the nature of citizen-state relations configured. This approach results in a more 
critical view of the potential of publics through Facebook. From one perspective, 
attention to participants’ experiences in the Facebook group, MYS, vividly conveys the 
elusive nature of being ‘public’: its scope was clearly evasive, and people could express 
themselves in varied and unpredictable ways. Yet, from another perspective, while 
clearly revealing these conditions of ‘publics’, their particularities challenged their 
ability to reconfigure shared imaginaries. In MYS, features giving rise to publicity and 
plurality also removed cues that might encourage participants, together, to accept novel 
appearances as reflective of a person. Appearances were met with mistrust. 
Contributions were suspected of hidden interests, partially tied to an awareness of group 
administrators’ controls. At the same time, attention was diverted away from other 
limits on publicity, specifically Facebook’s technological and corporate dimensions. 
Looking forward, these dynamics compel further interrogation into the ways both 
visibilities and invisibilities tied to experiences via Facebook limit potential shared 
imaginaries. Thus, while actively giving shape to ‘publics’, this article suggests the need 
for caution about the possibilities of Facebook-mediated publics to realise new and 
shared imaginaries.  
 
Figure captions 
Figure 1. Mombasa Youth Senate Facebook group’s discussion page, screenshot from a 
laptop, recorded on 3 October 2015, 20:05 EAT 
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Figure 2. A changing object of observation: Excerpts from a discussion in MYS 
retrieved on 22 February, 23 April and 20 October 2015 (Part A)64 
Figure 3. A changing object of observation: Excerpts from a discussion in MYS 
retrieved on 22 February, 23 April and 20 October 2015 (Part B) 
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